Diverse societal beliefs and redistributive policies, but equal welfare: The trade-off effect of information by Gabrieli, T.
Gabrieli, T. (2010). Diverse societal beliefs and redistributive policies, but equal welfare: The trade-off 
effect of information (Report No. 10/04). London, UK: Department of Economics, City University 
London.
City Research Online
Original citation: Gabrieli, T. (2010). Diverse societal beliefs and redistributive policies, but equal 
welfare: The trade-off effect of information (Report No. 10/04). London, UK: Department of 
Economics, City University London.
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/1488/
 
Copyright & reuse
City  University  London has developed City  Research Online  so that  its  users  may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders. Users may download and/ or print 
one  copy  of  any  article(s)  in  City  Research  Online  to  facilitate  their  private  study  or  for  non-
commercial research. Users may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any 
profit-making activities or any commercial gain. All material in City Research Online is checked for 
eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs from City Research 
Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised to 
check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact  
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
 
 
 
 
Department of Economics 
 
Diverse Societal Beliefs and Redistributive Policies, but Equal 
Welfare: The Trade-off Effect of Information 
  
 
 
 
Tommaso Gabrieli1 
Henley Business School, University of Reading 
and City University London 
 
 
 
  
  
 
Department of Economics 
Discussion Paper Series 
No. 10/04
 
 
1 Department of Economics, City University London, Social Sciences Bldg, Northampton Square, London EC1V 0HB, UK.  
Email: t.gabrieli@reading.ac.uk. T: +44 (0)118 378 4257 
 
 
DIVERSE SOCIETAL BELIEFS AND REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICIES, BUT
EQUAL WELFARE: THE TRADE-OFF EFFECT OF INFORMATION
TOMMASO GABRIELI*
THIS VERSION JANUARY 2010, FIRST VERSION OCTOBER 2007
ABSTRACT. Large empirical evidence shows that the difference in the political sup-
port for redistribution appears to reflect a difference in the social perceptions regard-
ing the determinants of individual wealth and the underlying sources of income in-
equality. This paper presents a model of beliefs and redistribution which explains
this evidence through multiple politico-economic equilibria. Differently from the re-
cent literature which obtains multiple equilibria by modeling agents characterized
by psychological biases, my model is based on standard assumptions. Multiple equi-
libria originate from multiple optimal levels of information for the society. Multiple
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21. INTRODUCTION
Why do similarly developed countries choose widely different social contracts?
The archetypical example is represented by the persistence and co-existence of European-
type welfare states versus the US-type laissez-faire social contracts. Such question is
not new and has motivated a large body of research across disciplines.
Without denying the importance of some “fundamental”differences across coun-
tries which can impact on such redistributive outcomes, economists have tradition-
ally looked for explanations of such societal choices without appealing to exogenous
differences in tastes, technologies or political systems. Under this perspective, re-
distributive outcomes are not considered as exogenous but are endogenously deter-
mined taking the political process into account.
1.1. The contribution of the previous literature. An influential strand of literature
which started in the 90’s has developed models of inequality, redistribution and
growth building on the seminal contribution of Meltzer and Richard (1981). The
basic prediction of the framework of Meltzer and Richard (1981) is that of a unique
equilibrium rate of redistribution, where greater inequality translates into a poorer
median voter relative to the country’s mean income and therefore the greater the
inequality and the higher it is the prevailing (or equilibrium) rate of redistribution
in the economy. The observation that, especially across developed countries, higher
pre-tax inequality does not seem to imply higher redistribution is therefore incon-
sistent with the predictions of the theory of Meltzer and Richard (1981) and of some
following models.1
1Perotti (1994), Perotti (1996) and most of the other studies reviewed in Benabou (1996) find no re-
lationship between inequality and the share of government expenditures in GDP. Among advanced
countries the effect is actually negative. This is suggested by many examples as the differences be-
tween (Western) Europe and the US. Western European countries (“Europe”in short) are character-
ized by more extensive redistributive policies than the US. Nevertheless, contrary to the Meltzer-
Richard paradigm of redistribution, pre-tax inequality is higher in the US than in Europe. Alesina
and Angeletos (2005) report that while the Gini coefficient in the pre-tax income distribution in the
US is 38.5 against 29.1 in Europe, the income tax structure is more progressive in Europe, the overall
size of government is about 50 per cent larger in Europe than in the United States (about 30 ver-
sus about 45 per cent of GDP) and the largest difference is represented by transfers and other social
benefits, where Europeans spend about twice as much as Americans. More extensive and detailed
evidence about this can be found in Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote (2001) and Alesina and Glaeser
(2004). Important contributions which introduced the framework of Meltzer and Richard (1981) in
dynamic models of growth and inequality are those of Perotti (1993), Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and
Persson and Tabellini (1994) among others.
3Despite the existence of solid alternative theoretical explanations 2, a small but
growing literature has pointed to the fact that the observed differences in the polit-
ical support for redistribution appear to reflect the differences in the beliefs which
different societies hold about the underlying determinants of individual wealth and
the extent of social mobility. Not only notable differences exist in the level of redistri-
bution (or social contract) across countries, striking differences appear in the beliefs
that different societies hold about the underlying determinants of individual for-
tunes and poverty and such beliefs appear to be determinant for the observed social
contracts. Once again the most striking difference relates to the differences between
the United States and Western Europe. Since De Tocqueville (1835), many have no-
ticed the exceptionalism or dream characterizing the American society, in other words
the widespread belief according to which everyone can become rich if wants so and
mobility is high in the “land of opportunities”.3 De Tocqueville (1835) himself and
many other sociologists and political scientists after him have pointed to persistent
differences in the popular beliefs about social mobility in explaining the persistent
differences between US and European redistributive politics. Those observed mas-
sive differences in the beliefs appear to be important, especially since there is a strong
correlation between these beliefs and the actual levels of redistribution and there is
also empirical evidence about the fact that beliefs are actually strong determinants
of the demand for redistribution.4
2Departing from the basic Meltzer and Richard (1981) framework but still considering the level of re-
distribution as endogenously determined, the theories of Benabou (2000), Benabou (2005), Saint-Paul
(2001), Hassler, Rodriguez-Mora, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2003) have been able to show how both
European-typewelfare states and US-type laissez-faire societies, together with respectively lower and
higher levels of inequality, can arise as multiple steady states from the joint dynamics of the wealth
distribution and redistributive policies.
3Recent data from the World Values Survey reported by Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote (2001) and
Keely (2002) show that only 29 percent of Americans believe that the poor are trapped in poverty and
cannot escape it and only 30 percent that luck, rather than effort or education, determines income.
Conversely, the data for Europe are 60 percent and 54 percent, respectively. Ladd and Bowman (1998)
show that in a similar way 60 percent of Americans versus 26 percent of Europeans are likely to
think that the poor “are lazy or lack willpower”and that 59 percent of Americans versus 34 percent
of Europeans are likely to think that “in the long run, hard work usually brings a better life”. Suhrcke
(2001) shows that large disparities in attitudes also exist within Europe, especially between OECD
and Eastern European countries.
4See Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote (2001) about the cross correlation between the belief that “luck
determines wealth”and the level of redistribution. See Fong (2001), Corneo and Gruner (2002),
Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) about the evidence showing that beliefs are strong determinants of
the demand for redistribution and that individual beliefs determine individual political orientations
more than other factors like personal wealth.
4The theoretical contributions of Piketty (1995), Alesina and Angeletos (2005) and
Benabou and Tirole (2006) have developed insightful theoretical models describing
how individual beliefs can shape politico-economic outcomes and viceversa and
howmultiple equilibria (US-type vs Europe-type) with different beliefs are possible.
The standard Meltzer and Richard (1981) model has a unique equilibrium where the
greater is the inequality and the lower is the wealth of the median voter with respect
to the mean and consequently the higher is the prevailing rate of redistribution. In
order to introduce a role for beliefs and derive multiple equilibria these models in-
troduce new elements. One common feature is that the economic agents described
by these models have incomplete information about the determinants of individ-
ual wealth, namely about the value of the return on effort versus the value of the
predetermined factors on which the individual has no control. It is this incomplete
information to create the premise for different beliefs about the role of controllable
(as hard work and discipline) vs. uncontrollable (as luck or family of origin) factors
in the determination of wealth. Moreover a standard moral hazard effect implies
that the greater is the expected value of the return on effort and the greater is the ef-
ficiency loss from redistribution, for this reason different beliefs may lead to different
prevailing redistribution rates in the political game. In the model of Piketty (1995)
agents have incomplete information about the true return on effort versus the role of
predetermined factors and the experimentation of different levels of effort is costly.
This implies that the steady-state beliefs resulting from a bayesan learning process
over an infinite horizon do not necessarily have to be the correct ones. US- (Europe-)
type equilibria characterized by the widespread belief that effort plays a major (mi-
nor) role and by low (high) redistribution are possible equilibria. Making a link to
some recent literature in behavioral economics, the models of Alesina and Angeletos
(2005) and Benabou and Tirole (2006) introduce different psychological elements in
this framework. Alesina and Angeletos (2005) model agents who have a concern for
the fairness of the economic system, namely for the fact that people should get what
they deserve and effort rather than luck should determine economic success. Also in
this model, agents have imperfect information about the true return on effort versus
the role of predetermined factors and this allows for different beliefs. The authors
discuss two equilibria of the model: in a US-type equilibrium agents believe that ef-
fort more than luck determines personal wealth, consequently they vote for low re-
distribution, incentives are not distorted and the belief is self sustained. Conversely,
in the Europe-type equilibrium agents believe that the economic system is not fair
5and factors as luck, birth, connections, rather than effort, determine personal wealth,
hence they vote for high taxes, thus distorting allocations and making the beliefs to
be self sustained. 5 Differently, in the work of Benabou and Tirole (2006) multiple
beliefs are possible because the agents find optimal to deliberately bias their own
perception of the truth so as to offset another bias which is procrastination. Also in
this model agents have incomplete information about the true return on effort ver-
sus the role of predetermined factors, but in addition to this each agent receives a
signal about the value of the return on effort. The novel feature of the model is that
each agent can decide the precision of the signal, in other words each agent can de-
cide how much to be informed and manipulate her own (or her children’s) beliefs.
Such formalization wants to capture the idea that (false) beliefs about the underlying
determinants of wealth and social mobility could derive from a false consciousness
which is chosen and valued by the worker themselves. Extensive evidence in sociol-
ogy and psychology seems to suggest this fact.6 Given time inconsistent preferences,
which captures the idea of procrastination and imperfect willpower, for each agent it
is optimal to have imperfect information so to think that the return on effort is greater
than the true value. This is because such belief increases the effort implemented by
the future self (using the language of behavioral economics, or the future generation
according to a more standard interpretation of the model). Nevertheless this bias has
a cognitive cost and when people anticipate little redistribution the value of a proper
motivation (in other words the value of believing that the return on effort is greater
than the true value) is much higher than with higher redistribution. When redistri-
bution is low everyone thus has greater incentives to believe that effort plays a major
role7 and consequently more voters finds optimal to hold to such a world-view. Due
to these complementarities between individuals ideological choices, there can be two
equilibria. A first, “American”equilibrium is characterized by a high prevalence of
the belief that the return on effort is high and relatively low redistribution. The other,
“European”equilibrium is characterized by a high prevalence of the belief that the
return on effort is low and relatively high redistribution.
5Similarly to the paper of Alesina and Angeletos (2005), also in the work of Cervellati, Esteban, and
Kranich (2006) the individual preferred level of redistribution is not motivated by purely selfish con-
cerns as inMeltzer and Richard (1981) but also by a social component; in this model, though, multiple
equilibria do not originate from different beliefs but from different moral sentiments.
6See Benabou and Tirole (2006) for precise references.
7In the words of Benabou and Tirole (2006) this is the Belief in a Just World
61.2. The contribution of this paper. In this paper I present a new theoretical frame-
work which shares some of the underlying features of the last group of models but,
unlike those, allows for varying degrees of incomplete information in the economy
and focuses on the effect that incomplete information has on the political and eco-
nomic outcomes. As I have already explained in the previous section, incomplete
information is a common element in the models of Piketty (1995), Alesina and An-
geletos (2005) and Benabou and Tirole (2006), but it is the addition of other elements
on top of that to imply the existence of multiple equilibria in these models. I have
already discussed that those additional elements are imperfect learning in Piketty
(1995) and psychological elements as preferences for social fairness in Alesina and
Angeletos (2005) or as time inconsistent preferences and cognitive dissonance in Ben-
abou and Tirole (2006). Nevertheless, the degree of underlying incomplete informa-
tion in those models is fixed, in other words a government or another institution
could not do anything in order to increase the agents’ information about the value
of the return on effort versus “luck”. In reality it appears to be the case that there are
ways in which institutions can influence agents’ information about the underlying
determinants of wealth andmobility. For example, the type of education can have an
impact on the degree of information because the return on effort θ depends on indi-
vidual ability and an educational systemwhich reveals individual abilities better can
be a way to make individual beliefs to be more realistic. Another way for an institu-
tion to provide more information could be to provide accurate historical data on the
dynamics of mobility. Or again the information of the agents can be influenced by
propaganda: a government or a group of people could try to convince others about
the importance of effort versus predetermined factors. It is useful to precise that the
contribution is not to build a detailed analysis of endogenous propaganda or educa-
tional features.8 It is instead a more abstract exercise which, assuming that there is
an institution which can influence the degree of information as indeed seems to be
the case, considers the degree of information as a policy variable and answers to a
natural policy questions: What is the effect of varying degree of information on in-
dividual choices and aggregate outcomes? What is the optimal level of information
given different objectives?
I develop a model which extensively builds extensively on the framework which
is shared by the models of Piketty (1995), Alesina and Angeletos (2005) and Benabou
8Nevertheless I will also offer some predictions at this level which are interestingly in line with some
existing empirical and anecdotal evidence.
7and Tirole (2006). Individual wealth still depends on effort and “luck”, agents still
have incomplete information about the true value of the return on effort and with
such incomplete information they first vote over redistribution and then exert effort.
The novel feature is represented by allowing for varying degrees of incomplete of
information and consequently derive the comparative statics of the individual and
aggregate political and economic outcomes. In order to allow for varying degrees
of incomplete information I introduce a simple informative set-up. The economic
agents in my model do not know the true value of the individual return on effort
on ability but receive informative signals about this individual value. The precision
of the signals is the same across agents and this feature wants to capture the idea
that the level of information is an institutional feature of the economy.9 Varying the
precision of the signal means to vary the degree of information in the economy. This
framework isolates the effect of incomplete information, as other elements10 are not
present in the model and allows a clear analysis of a number of interesting com-
parative statics. The degree of information impacts on two individual choices: the
decision about voting over redistribution and the choice of effort. Increasing the
level of information improves the individual choices of effort. For this reason, net
of the effect that information has on the voted rate of redistribution, increasing the
level of information improves ex-ante welfare. Conversely, increasing the level of
information can increase or decrease the prevailing rate of redistribution depending
on the identity of the median voter. The most interesting case is when increasing the
level of information increases the prevailing rate of redistribution. In such case, in
a model with linear utility in wealth and therefore where the ex-ante optimal rate
of redistribution is equal to zero, increasing the level of information has a trade-off
effect: on one hand it improves the allocation of individual effort but on the other
hand it raises inefficient redistributive taxation. This represents the first result of my
analysis, namely that welfare does not increase monotonically in information.11 A
second result consists in showing that, generally, the welfare function can be both
concave and convex in the level of information. The reason for this is essentially
that, net of the effect of the redistributive tax, the welfare function is convex in the
9Of course it would be realistic and interesting to allow for the possibility of different precisions across
groups of agents or networks and I leave this exercise to the future research.
10For example there are not the psychological elements which were present in the models of Alesina
and Angeletos (2005) and Benabou and Tirole (2006).
11This result is not entirely dependent on the assumption of linear utility function as I will discuss in
appendix D
8level of information. Such result links back to the seminal contribution of Radner
and Stiglitz (1984) who show the convexity of the value of information. The convex-
ity of the welfare function implies that there are cases of multiple optimal levels of
information. Considering the level of information as a policy variable, the compara-
tive statics of varying levels of information can address interesting policy questions.
In addition to the comparative statics which relate to welfare, I analyze the com-
parative statics of all the other political and economic outcomes: prevailing rate of
redistribution, individual and aggregate effort and output. A third result relates to
the comparative statics of aggregate output. I show that also aggregate output is not
monotonic in the level of information and in addition can be both concave and con-
vex; nevertheless, in the case in which the prevailing rate of redistribution increases
in the level of information I show that output is maximized for the minimum level
of information.
Up to this point I have described comparative statics results which are obtained
varying the level of information exogenously. The second step of my analysis is to
consider an endogenous prevailing level of information. I model it as the result of
a collective choice. In the case in which every agent is identical before receiving the
informative signal about individual ability, all agents agree on the same ex-ante op-
timal level of information which also maximizes ex-ante welfare. Fixed the level of
information as the ex-ante welfare maximizing, I define a politico-economic equilib-
rium as the resulting beliefs, prevailing level of redistribution and optimal individ-
ual choices of effort. Given multiple optimal values of information, there are mul-
tiple politico-economic equilibria which can still be interpreted as US-type versus
Europe-type. The two equilibria still present the known macroeconomic features
found by the previous literature, namely that the US-type (Europe-type) politico-
economic equilibrium is characterized by relatively low (high) redistribution and
high (low) aggregate output. What is new in my model is a characterization of
the two equilibria in terms of the informative features. I find a US- (Europe-) type
politico-economic equilibrium to be characterized by relatively (i) low (high) infor-
mative signals and high (low) adverse selection, as individual beliefs and effort lev-
els are pooled (separated) (ii) low (high) moral hazard, as redistribution is low (high)
and hence does not (does) distort individual effort to a great extent. With respect to
the existence of multiple politico-economic equilibria, this paper presents a method-
ological contribution as it shows that multiple equilibria can be obtained without
psychological biases. For what concerns the interpretation of the two equilibria, the
9contribution is to show that otherwise similar societies may find optimal to choose
different information “cultures”which consequently imply different beliefs’ systems
and different politico-economic outcomes.
In my model the US-type (Europe-type) equilibrium has signals which are rela-
tively less (more) informative and separate less (more) the beliefs on the return on
effort. The two equilibria can still be respectively interpreted as Belief in a Just World
vs. Realistic Pessimism as in the model of Benabou and Tirole (2006): the US-type
equilibrium can be interpreted as Belief in a Just World because in such equilibrium
the majority of the agents deny “bad news”and believe the return on effort to be
higher than what it really is. In addition, my model gives another interesting inter-
pretation of the two equilibria: relatively to the EU-type, the US-type equilibrium is
characterized by a stronger belief in equal opportunities. Conditional on the signal,
in the US-type (EU-type) equilibrium agents believe that opportunities are relatively
more (less) equal, as the posterior beliefs about the return on effort are less (more)
heterogeneous. Adding this new interpretation seems to be important to understand
better the two societies as the concept of equal opportunities seems to be inherently
related to the one of American dream vs. European realism or pessimism. The expres-
sion American Dreamwas coined by Adams (1931):
“The American Dream is that dream of a land in which life should be better and richer
and fuller for everyone, with opportunity for each according to ability or achievement. It is
a difficult dream for the European upper classes to interpret adequately, and too many of us
ourselves have grown weary and mistrustful of it. It is not a dream of motor cars and high
wages merely, but a dream of social order in which each man and each woman shall be able
to attain to the fullest stature of which they are innately capable, and be recognized by others
for what they are, regardless of the fortuitous circumstances of birth or position.”
For people to believe in the dream of a land in which life should be better and
richer and fuller for everyone and “that every child in America has a decent shot
at life and that the doors of opportunity remain open to all”12 it must be the case
that opportunities (i.e. the return on effort) cannot be considered too heterogenous
across individuals (otherwise some individuals would be coursed from birth to be
low achievers). My model therefore predicts the US-type equilibrium, relatively to
12Those words have been used by Senator Barack Obama to describe the concept of American Dream
in his speech on 27th July 2004, commonly referred to as Reclaiming the American Dream.
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the Europe-type, to be characterized by a stronger belief in equal opportunities, as it
seems to be the case.
Mymodel can also shed some light onwhy two different beliefs systems came into
existence and persisted in history. One interesting property of the equilibrium in my
model (section 6) shows that two otherwise similar societies with small differences
in the extent of the heterogeneity in the prior distribution of the return on effort
across agents, may find optimal to choose very different informative cultures: the
society with marginally smaller heterogeneity may choose low informative signals
and hence US-type beliefs (i.e. Belief in a Just World and belief in equal opportunities).
Looking at the historical experiences of US and Europe it seems to be the case
that in the days of the first pioneers, opportunities were indeed more equal and
individual types more homogeneous in the “Land of Opportunities”than in the “Old
Continent”. Quoting McElroy (2006) (pp 60):
The self-selected immigrants who came to America by their own free choice came as hopeful
individuals in search of opportunities to improve their individual lives. Among the things
that they fled in leaving Europe were the limitations of the class membership that typified
Europe’s aristocratic cultures. They wanted to belong to a new society that would encourage
their aspirations of self-improvement and their ambition to rise in society.
The properties of the equilibrium in my model (section 6) show how those initial
differences can have implied that the societies find two different sets of beliefs to
be optimal. Therefore my model can offer an explanation about how certain types
of beliefs came to existence and persisted through the collective choice of a certain
information structure. In this respect, without denying the importance of other in-
stitutional factors, mymodel offers a complementary institutional explanation to the
more traditional one which is common in political science and sociology. 13
13A more modern and more symmetric version of the more traditional Neo-Marxist view can be
found in the work of Alesina and Glaeser (2004). The authors argue that just as American beliefs
result from indoctrination predominantly controlled by the wealthier classes, European beliefs re-
sult from indoctrination predominantly controlled by Marxist-influenced intellectuals. Alesina and
Glaeser (2004) claim that the process of indoctrination has been achieved through the choice of spe-
cific institutions and political systems. For example they show how, in the American political history,
factors like federalism, majority representation and segregation worked towards low cross-ethnic co-
hesion and the described beliefs.
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Finally, it seems that a natural way to think about how societies have maintained
different information “cultures”is to think about different educational systems. There-
fore a natural interpretation of the precision of the signals is how much the school-
ing system informs students and parents about individual skills. As predicted by
my model, there exists empirical evidence showing how the American secondary
schooling system separates less than the European.14
In summary, my model interprets different (US vs Europe type) politico and eco-
nomic outcomes as originated by different optimal informative cultures, where dif-
ferent (US vs Europe type) informative cultures present the following features: (i)
more vs less widespread belief that effort more than luck determines individual
wealth (ii) more vs less widespread belief that opportunities are equal (iii) more vs
less separating educational systems. As already discussed both existing literature
and stylized facts support such interpretation. A deeper empirical test of the inter-
pretation of my theoretical results goes beyond the scope of this paper, nevertheless
could be a fertile ground for future research.
The present paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the set-up of the
model. Section 3 analyzes the voting problem and the relative outcome. Section
4 analyzes the comparative statics considering the precision of the signal as an ex-
ogenous policy variable. In section 5 I analyze the optimal ex-ante precision for the
economy. In section 6 I introduce the concept of politico-economic equilibrium and
investigate the possibility of existence of multiple equilibria. Section 7 analyzes the
robustness and the generalization of the results. Section 8 concludes. Appendixes A
and B contain some lengthly proofs. Appendixes C andD respectively introduce het-
erogenous endowments and risk aversion in the model and, testing for the model’s
robustness, show that the conclusions do not change.
14The main reason is that curriculum-based external exit examinations (CBEEE) are relatively more
common in Europe. See Bishop (1997) for an introduction to the topic and Bishop (1996) and Woess-
mann (2003) for comparative studies of US vs. Europe. Another reason is that also early tracking is
relatively more common in Europe, see Woessmann (2009). Despite the existing empirical evidence
on the different informative power of the two schooling systems, the prediction of mymodel does not
have to be that the European system informs relatively better than the US one, but only that separates
more (wether with right or wrong signals) as it indeed appears to be the case.
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2. SET UP
I Consider an economy populated by a continuum of agents i ∈ [0, 1]. Each indi-
vidual i produces a quantity yi of output with the following technology:
(1) yi = ki + θiei,
where ki is an observable endowment of resources, ei is the effort implemented by
agent i and θi is the return to effort or productivity. In this basic version of the model
I assume that the endowment is homogeneous across agents, i.e. ki = k for all i.15 I
assume that θi is i.i.d. across agents and that θi takes value θL with probability pi and
value θH with probability 1−pi, where θL < θH . Agents have incomplete information:
each agent i cannot observe her own or other agents’ productivity but only receives
a private signal σi about the true value of θi. Also the signal σi is binary. If θi = θL
(θi = θH), σ
i takes values σL (σH ) or σH (σL), respectively with probability λ and
1 − λ. In other words for each agent i the signal σi is independently distributed, it
is truthful with probability λ, false with probability 1 − λ and the transition matrix
which takes from the true productivity to the signal is the following:
(2) T
([
σL
σH
] ∣∣∣ [θL, θH ]
)
=
(
λ 1− λ
1− λ λ
)
.
The structure of the economy – including the value of pi and matrix (2) – is com-
mon knowledge, the only incomplete information is about the true values of the θ’s.
Agents are fully rational and agent’s i belief of the true value of θi, conditional on
the observation of the private signal σi, is obtained by the Bayes Rule. I introduce
the following notation:
(3) µi ≡ Pr[θi = θL|σ
i],
represents agent i belief that θi = θL conditional on the observation of signal σ
i. From
the Bayes rule it follows that:
(4) µσL ≡ (µ
i|σi = σL) =
piλ
piλ+ (1− pi)(1− λ)
15It will be clear that an homogeneous endowment does not play any role and without loss of gen-
erality I could set k = 0. Nevertheless, this very simple technology is enough to capture the role
of “luck”versus effort. Section C (supplemental material) considers the possibility of heterogenous
endowments.
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and
(5) µσH ≡ (µ
i|σi = σH) =
pi(1− λ)
pi(1− λ) + λ(1− pi)
.
The expected value of θi conditional on the observation of σi is given by the follow-
ing expression:
(6) θ(µi) ≡ µiθL + (1− µ
i)θH .
Given the symmetric structure of (2) I consider the interval λ ∈ [1/2, 1]. For λ = 1/2
the signal σi is completely uninformative and the posterior belief is equal to the
prior, i.e. µσL=µσH=pi. Increasing λmakes the signal progressively more informative
up to the point that λ = 1 and the signal is perfectly informative, i.e. µσL = 1,
µσH = 0.
16 As already explained in the introduction, the value of λ represents the
level of information in the economy and in a rather abstract way I consider it is an
institutional feature and a policy variable. The ex-ante probability of observing σL is
given by the following expression:
(7) pσL ≡ Pr[σ
i = σL] = λpi + (1− λ)(1− pi),
symmetrically
(8) pσH ≡ Pr[σ
i = σH ] = λ(1− pi) + pi(1− λ) = 1− pσL .
Over-lined variables stand for mean values for the population, hence y¯ and e¯ are
respectively the mean, or aggregate, values of output and effort and
θ ≡ piθL + (1− pi)θH ,
θ2 ≡ piθ2L + (1− pi)θ
2
H ,
are respectively the mean values of productivity and squared productivity. Agents
face a linear income tax/redistribution scheme which implies the following expres-
sion for individual consumption:
(9) ci = (1− τ)yi + τ y¯,
where τ is the tax rate which prevails in the political gamewithmajority voting. Such
linear redistribution scheme is due to Romer (1975), it is standard in this literature
16I could have alternatively considered the interval λ ∈ [0, 1/2], in this case λ = 0 implies that the
signal is perfectly informative and increasing λ up to λ = 1/2 makes the signal progressively less
informative. It will be clear that given the symmetric structure of the signal the entire analysis would
be symmetric to the one obtained considering λ ∈ [1/2, 1].
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and implies that the government budget constraint is always binding. Throughout
the analysis I consider the following individual utility function17:
(10) ui(ci, ei) = ci −
a
2
(ei)2.
I consider three periods t = {0, 1, 2} and the following timing. In period 0 each
agent only knows the values pi, λ and the structure of the game. In period 1 each
agent i receives the private signal σi, then votes over the tax rate τ and once that the
prevailing tax rate is revealed, each agent i chooses the effort level ei. In the final
period individual income yi is realized, agents get the net outcome of the production
activity plus a net transfer and enjoy consumption18.
3. VOTERS’ PROBLEM
Plugging expressions (1) and (9) into (10) I obtain the expression of the expected
utility of agent i at t:
(11) uit = E[(1− τ)(k + e
iθi) + τ(k + eθ)− a(ei)2/2|I it ],
where E[·|I it ] is individual i’s expectation conditional on the information at time t.
As explained in the previous section, the information structure is such that I i0 = T
and I i1 = (T, σ
i). Given that voting and effort choices take place at t = 1, after that the
signal σi is received, what is important to bear in mind is that the objective function
that each agent i maximizes when voting and choosing effort is the expected utility
(11) conditional on signal σi. Solving backwards, each individual i maximizes (11)
choosing ei after that the winning tax rate τ is announced. Being (11) strictly concave
in ei, by solving the sufficient first order condition I find the optimal individual level
of effort:
(12) ei = (1− τ)θ(µi)/a.
By backward induction, I can plug (12) into (11) and find the objective function that
i maximizes when voting for the tax rate. In order to do this, it is useful to specify
17In section D (supplemental material) I will consider the possibility of concavity in consumption and
discuss the relative implications.
18Therefore in the final period the uncertainty regarding the value of θi is resolved as agents can infer
the true value of θi from yi. Nevertheless, after period 2 the same sequence of events can be repeated
for the next generation; in absence of intergenerational transfers and with completely uncorrelated
skills, the same results would still apply.
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the individual i expectation of the output from effort:
(13) E[eiθi|I i1] = (1− τ)
(
θ(µi)
)2
/a
and of squared effort
(14) E[(ei)2|I i1] = (e
i)2 =
(
1− τ
a
)2
θ(µi)2.
In computing the mean (aggregate) product of effort eθ, each agent i knows that that
a fraction pi (1 − pi) of the agents have productivity θL (θH) and that among those
a fraction λ chooses the optimal effort after the observation of σL (σH), whereas a
fraction 1 − λ chooses the optimal effort after the observation of σH (σL). Therefore
it is the case that
(15) E[eθ|I i1] = (1− τ)Γ/a,
where I define
(16) Γ ≡ piθL (λθ(µσL) + (1− λ)θ(µσH))+
(1− pi)θH ((1− λ)θ(µσL) + λθ(µσH )) .
Collecting θ(µσL) and θ(µσH ) it is easy to re-write expression (16) as
(17) Γ = pσLθ(µσL)
2 + (1− pσL)θ(µσH )
2.
The term Γ is the expression for aggregate output from effort, net of the distortive
effect of redistribution on effort. It will be shown that this term will play a crucial
role in the analysis. Plugging (13), (14) and (16) into (11), I obtain an indirect form of
(11) as a function of τ :
(18) ui1 = k
i + (1− τ)2θ(µi)2/a+ τ(1− τ)Γ/a− (1− τ)2θ(µi)2/2a.
This is the object that voter imaximizes voting over the tax rate τ . Assuming for the
moment that the second derivative of the objective function (18) is strictly negative,
the ideal tax rate of agent i follows from the first order condition:
(19) τ(µi) = 1−
1
2− θ(µ
i)2
Γ
.
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The denominator of (19) shows how the subjective prospects of upward mobility
reduce the desired tax rate.19 I introduce an assumption which bounds above the
heterogeneity in individual abilities in order to assure the concavity of the objective
function (18) and thus to use the median voter theorem.
Assumption 1: 2θ2L > θ
2
H .
A proposition follows:
Proposition 1. Individual preferences for the rate of redistribution are single peaked and the
individual ideal rate of redistribution is given by expression (19).
Proof. The second derivative of the objective function in problem (18) is given by the
following expression:
d2ui1
dτ
=
−2Γ + θ(µi)2
a
.
The condition stated by Assumption 1 is sufficient for (20) to be strictly negative as
the maximum value that θ(µ)2 can take is θ2H and the minimum value that 2Γ can
take is 2θ2L. 
Proposition 1 shows that preferences over the tax rate are single peaked and there-
fore the median voter theorem applies. Labeling the prevailing tax rate in the voting
game as τ , I analyze the political outcome. There are two groups of voters in the
economy: those who observe σL and those who observe σH , respectively with pre-
ferred tax rates τ(µσL) and τ(µσH ). Given the majority voting rule, if pσL > (<) 1/2,
then τ = τ(µσL) (τ = τ(µσH )) is the prevailing tax rate in the economy.
20
4. COMPARATIVE STATICS
I analyze the effect of a change in the value of the level of information λ on the
endogenous variables of the model: prevailing tax rate, individual and aggregate
effort, aggregate output. As already explained in the introduction, this is a natural
exercise in order to understand the effects of policies which change – directly or
19The concept of prospects of upward mobility and its role in the determination of the prevailing rate
of redistribution is the focus of the analysis of Benabou and Ok (2001). The term θ(µ
i)2
Γ represents the
subjective prospects of upward mobility as it is equal to the the ratio of individual output (13) over
aggregate output (15), noticing that the term 1−τ
a
gets canceled out.
20Obviously when pσL = 1/2 the majority group is undetermined. Notice also that if λ = 1/2 the
signal is uninformative and µσL = µσH = pi (namely the prior is equal to the posterior) and every
agent i prefers the same tax rate τ(µi), where µi = pi. From (19) it is easy to notice that for µi = pi,
τ(µi) = 0; this follows from the fact that µσL = µσH = pi implies that θ(µ)
2 = Γ = (θ¯)2.
17
indirectly – the level of information in an economy, for example policies based on
education or policies based on propaganda. In the following two lemmas I present
two important intermediate results which are fundamental for the full analysis of
the comparative statics.
Lemma 1. The expected value of individual ability (6), conditional on the observation of
signal σL (σH ), is decreasing (increasing) in the level of information λ.
Proof. This property of monotonicity is immediately proved from the computation
of the respective first derivative with respect to λ:
dθ(µσL)
dλ
= −
pi(1− pi)(θH − θL)
(2piλ+ 1− λ− pi)2
< 0,
dθ(µσH )
dλ
=
pi(1− pi)(θH − θL)
(2piλ− λ− pi)2
> 0.

It is straightforward to interpret this result: when the level of information in the
economy is minimum (λ = 1/2) everyone maintains the prior belief to be of average
ability θ¯. Increasing the the precision of the signals λ implies that the Bayes updating
“relies”more on the signal and the expectation of those agents who receive the signal
σL (σH) get progressively closer to the the value θL (θH ). The following result defines
the comparative statics which relate to expression (16), namely aggregate output
from effort net of the distortive effect of redistribution on effort.
Lemma 2. The expression of Γ (16) is (i) increasing and (ii) convex in the level of information
λ.
The proof is in Appendix A. The intuition behind this result is very important.
Lemma 2 shows that when the incentive-distortive effect of taxation is not taken
into account, increasing information has a positive effect on aggregate output, as
agents choose effort more optimally given the true values of θL and θH . Expression
Γ measures ex-ante or aggregate output, net from the distortive effect of taxation,
and therefore is a measure of the value of information. The result of convexity in the
value of information is a known result in economic theory which goes back to the
seminal contribution of Radner and Stiglitz (1984). In order to study the comparative
statics of the endogenous variables of the model, I study the cases of pi > 1/2 and
pi < 1/2 separately.
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Comparative statics for the case of pi > 1/2. The case of pi > 1/2 implies, together
with the fact that λ ≥ 1/2, that pσL ≥ 1/2 and therefore that the majority of the agents
observes the signal σL and that the prevailing tax rate is τ = τ(µσL). A proposition
follows:
Proposition 2. If pi > 1/2, the prevailing tax rate τ is increasing in the level of information
λ.
Proof. Given that pi > 1/2 implies that the prevailing tax rate is τ = τ(µσL), taking the
expression for the tax rate (19) with µi = µσL , the proof follows in a straightforward
way from lemmas 1 and 2. 
From expression (19) it is easy to compute that the minimum value of the tax rate
is τ = 0, for λ = 1/2 and when θ(µ)2=Γ=(θ¯)2. In the same way, it is also immediate
that the maximum value of the tax rate is τ = 1 − 1
2−(θ2L/θ
2)
, for λ = 1. Notice also
that given that pi ∈ [0, 1), θ2L/θ
2 < 1 and hence τ ∈ [0, 1). The intuition behind the
comparative static of the prevailing tax rate is easy to understand. Given that the
majority group is the one formed by the agents who observe the signal σL, their
prospects of upper mobility decrease in the level of information and therefore their
expected gains from redistribution increase with the level of information.
In order to study the comparative statics which are relative to effort, using (12) I
define the optimal effort implemented by those who observe σL:
(20) e|σL ≡ (1− τ)θ(µσL)/a,
and by those who observe σH :
(21) e|σH ≡ (1− τ)θ(µσH )/a.
Multiplying by the respective weights I obtain the expression of aggregate effort:
(22) e¯ = (1− τ)(pσLθ(µσL) + (1− pσL)θ(µσH ))/a,
where it is easy to compute that pσLθ(µσL) + (1 − pσL)θ(µσH) = θ. A proposition
follows:
Proposition 3. If pi > 1/2, aggregate effort (22) is decreasing in the level of information λ.
The proof follows trivially from proposition 2 and from the fact that θ is a constant.
The result depends on the fact that the the only effect of information on aggregate
effort is through the distortive tax rate. To be more precise, information impacts
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the expressions of individual effort both through the tax rate and individual beliefs,
nevertheless at the aggregate level, information only impacts through the tax rate as
the effect on the beliefs of the two groups cancel out. Looking at the expression of the
optimal effort which is exerted by those who observe signal σL (20), it is immediate
to see that it decreases in level of information λ, given that both (1 − τ) and θ(µσL)
decrease as suggested by lemmas 1 and 2. Instead, the comparative static for the
expression of optimal effort which is exerted by those who observe signal σH (21)
is ambiguous as (1 − τ) is decreasing but θ(µσH ) is increasing. The overall effect
depends on the relative responsiveness of the two terms to λ. In a numerical example
which I will present in section 6 it will turn out to be non monotonic.
I discuss the comparative statics of output. Plugging (15) into (1) I obtain the
expression of aggregate output:
(23) y¯ = k + (1− τ)Γ/a.
Notice that for pi > 1/2 the effect of λ is not a-priori clear as given lemma 2 and
proposition 2, λ has opposite effects on (1 − τ) and Γ. Nevertheless I find an inter-
esting property:
Proposition 4. If pi > 1/2, the expression for aggregate output (23) is (i)either monotoni-
cally decreasing or monotonically decreasing up to a point and then monotonically increasing
in the level of information λ 21, (ii) maximized for λ = 1/2.
The proof is in Appendix B. This represents a striking policy result: aggregate
output is univocally maximized by the minimum level of information. Even if the
level of information λ has opposite effects on aggregate output, as it increases dis-
tortive taxes τ but at the same time it increases output from effort Γ through a better
allocation of effort, the distortive effect through the tax rate is always dominant. The
value of the aggregate output for λ = 1/2 is y¯ = k + θ
2
/a, the value of the aggregate
output for λ = 1 is y¯ = k + θ
2
2
a(2θ2−θ2L)
> 0.
Comparative statics for the case of pi < 1/2. The case of pi < 1/2 implies, together
with the fact that λ ≥ 1/2, that pσL ≤ 1/2 and therefore that the majority of the agents
observes the signal σH and that the prevailing tax rate is τ = τ(µσH ). In this case
the comparative statics of τ with respect to λ are generally non-monotonic. To see
this notice that in expression (19) both θ(µ) and Γ increase for λ ∈ [1/2, 1] and so
21This behavior can be described as single peaked from below and it is a form of quasi-convexity.
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the overall effect of λ is not a-priori clear. Nevertheless it is possible to find some
properties:
Proposition 5. In the case that pi < 1/2, the prevailing tax rate τ is (i) always negative and
(ii) if (2Γ∂θ(σH)
∂λ
) < θ(σH)
∂Γ
∂λ
, it is decreasing in the level of information λ.
Proof. It is useful to re-express (19) as
(24) τ =
Γ− θ(µσH )
2
2Γ− θ(µσH )
2
.
Notice that the numerator of (24) is always negative because Γ = pσLθ(µσL)
2 + (1 −
pσL)θ(µσH )
2 < θ(µσH )
2 for λ ∈ [1/2, 1], as it is the case that θ(µσH ) > θ(µσL). The
denominator is always positive under assumption 1. This proves the negativity of
the expression. To prove monotonicity I notice that the first derivative of τ with
respect to λ is dτ
dλ
=
θ(µσH )
(
2Γ
∂θ(µσH
)
∂λ
−θ(µσH )
∂Γ
∂λ
)
(2Γ2−θ(µσH ))
2 . Given lemmas 1 and 2, a sufficient
condition for τ to be monotonic decreasing is therefore that (2Γ
∂θ(µσH )
∂λ
) < θ(µσH )
∂Γ
∂λ
.

The negativity of the prevailing tax rate is easily interpretable. Given that the ma-
jority group which sets the tax rate is formed by the agents who observe the signal
σH , whenever λ is greater than 1/2 they expect to produce more than the average
individual and therefore to loose out from redistribution. When τ decreases mono-
tonically in λ it is straightforward that expression (23), lemma 2 and proposition 5
imply that aggregate output increases monotonically in λ. Moreover, given that the
tax rate is always negative, then the aggregate output is always greater than in the
case of pi ≥ 1/2.
Aggregate effort still depends exclusively on the tax rate, when τ decreases mono-
tonically in λ it is straightforward that expression (22) implies that aggregate effort
increases monotonically in λ. Moreover, given that the tax rate is always negative,
also aggregate effort is always greater than in the case of pi ≥ 1/2. In the case in
which τ decreases monotonically in λ, e|σH increases in λ, as both (1− τ) and θ(µσH )
increase. The effect of λ on e|σL is instead partially ambiguous, as (1 − τ) increases
in λ whereas θ(µσL) decreases. The overall effect depends on how responsive are τ
and θ(µL) to λ.
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5. OPTIMAL INFORMATION
In the previous section I studied different comparative statics and the results of-
fered insights for policy questions such as the level of information which maximizes
output or how the level of information does affect the voted tax rate. It is now a nat-
ural question to explore the comparative statics in terms of welfare. More precisely,
it is a natural question to explore the level of information which maximizes the ex-
ante utility, namely the utility function at time 0 before that the agents receive the
signal. In other words I investigate whether someone behind the veil of ignorance
desires to remove the veil.
In order to compute the expression of the expected utility at time 0, I notice that
at time 0, before receiving the signal, everyone is identical and expects to have mean
ability θ¯. It follows the expression of expected individual output from effort:
(25) E[eiθi|I i0] = E[eθ|I
i
1] = (1− τ)Γ/a,
and the expression for expected individual squared effort:
(26) E[(ei)2|I i0] =
(1− τ)2Γ
a2
.
Plugging (25) and (26) into (11) and rearranging I obtain the expression for expected
utility at t = 0:
(27) ui0 = k + (1− τ
2)Γ/2a.
Given that at time 0 everyone is identical this is the expression of both ex-ante indi-
vidual utility and aggregate welfare. If an agent had to choose an optimal value of
λ for the society at t = 0, she would choose a value of λ which maximizes (27). The
solution of the problem is not a-priori trivial.
Case of pi > 1/2. In the case of pi > 1/2, lemma 2 and proposition 2 show that λ
has opposite effects on (1 − τ 2) and Γ so that the overall effect is not a-priori clear.
Nevertheless I find an interesting property:
Proposition 6. If pi > 1/2, the expression of ex-ante utility (27) is either monotonically
decreasing or monotonically decreasing up to a point and then monotonically increasing22.
Proof. Expression (27) can be rewritten as k+(1+τ)(1−τ)Γ/2a. Notice that the deriv-
ative of (1 − τ)Γ has already been studied in proposition 4. I rename (1 + τ) ≡ a(λ)
22This behavior can be described as single peaked from below and it is a form of quasi-convexity.
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and (1 − τ)Γ ≡ b(λ), where a(λ) and b(λ) are functions of λ. I study the sign of
d(a(λ)b(λ))
dλ
= da
dλ
b + a db
dλ
in the interval λ ∈ [1/2, 1]. Using expression (32) in appendix
B it can be checked that this expression is strictly negative for λ = 1/2. Notice that
given proposition 2 da
dλ
b > 0 and that given proposition 4 a db
dλ
can change sign and
become positive at most once. Appendix B also shows that a db
dλ
starts negative and
increases monotonically. Therefore it follows that the entire expression for the de-
rivative d(a(λ)b(λ))
dλ
starts negative for λ = 1/2 and if it becomes positive, then it will
continue to be positive. 
This result implies that in the case of pi > 1/2, there are corner solutions: either
λ = 1/2 or λ = 1 maximize ex-ante utility (27). The result is interesting because
it shows that the ex-ante optimal level of information for the economy is either a
completely uninformative signal (λ = 1/2) or a completely informative signal λ = 1.
In other words agents either want to stay behind the veil of ignorance or want to
remove it completely. It is important to stress the economic intuition behind this
result. Firstly, increasing the level of information has a trade-off effect, on one hand it
improves the allocation of individual effort but on the other hand it raises inefficient
redistributive taxation, therefore ex-ante utility (27) does not increase monotonically
in the level of information λ. Secondly, the convexity of the value of information Γ
(lemma 2) implies that – as stated in proposition 6 – that ex-ante utility (27) is either
monotonically decreasing or quasi-convex and therefore the corner solutions.
Case of pi < 1/2. As explained with the analysis of the comparative static in the
previous section, in the case of pi < 1/2 it is possible that τ does not have a monotonic
behavior and this makes the effect of λ on (27) not clear. In the case in which the
condition for the monotonic behavior given in proposition (5) applies, then both
(1 − τ 2) and Γ increase in λ for λ ∈ [1/2, 1]. Hence (27) is maximized for λ = 0 or
λ = 1, i.e. for a perfectly informative signal.
Case of individual information λi. In order to gain further insights, I temporarily
depart from the original set-up assuming that each agent i at t = 0 can individually
chose the optimal precision λi of the signal to be observed at t = 1 by herself. In
this case the optimal value of λi would maximize the expected utility at t = 0 taking
the choices of the other agents as given. Plugging (25) and (26) into (11) I obtain the
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individual problem at t = 0:
(28) λi = arg max{(1− τ)(k¯ + (1− τ(λ))Γ(λi)/a)+
τ(λ)(k¯ + (1− τ(λ))Γ(λ)/a)− (1− τ(λ))2Γ(λi)/2a}.
As a single individual cannot influence the prevailing tax rate, this it taken as given
when the optimal λi is chosen. The problem has an easy solution because λi only
influences the object through Γ(λi), which monotonically increases in the level of
information (lemma 2). Therefore if individuals were free to autonomously choose
the individual level of information, then everyone would choose to be perfectly in-
formed and therefore the economy would be in a state which is identical to the case
of perfect information λ = 1 in the original set-up. This result helps to approach the
analysis of the next section.
6. POLITICO-ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM
In this section I consider the level of information λ in the economy to be an endoge-
nous outcome and I introduce the concept of Politico-Economic equilibrium. Using
the analysis of the previous section, I consider that the prevailing level of informa-
tion λ in the economy is the one which maximizes the ex-ante utility. Such value of
λ could be chosen by a benevolent planner, it could be a voting outcome or it could
be the outcome of any other collective choice. Being everyone ex-ante identical, as
long as the optimal λ is computed at t = 0, everyone would agree on the same value
of information. Once the level of information has been fixed as the ex-ante optimal,
individual and aggregate choices and outcomes follow as already described in the
previous sections. A definition follows:
Definition 1. I define a Politico–Economic Equilibrium as the prevailing level of
information, beliefs and voted rate of redistribution (λ, µσL, µσH , τ ) such that
(i) the prevailing level of information is ex ante optimal, i.e. λ = arg max u0,
(ii) beliefs are bayesan-rational, i.e. beliefs µσL and µσH are respectively given by (4)
and (5),
(iii) the prevailing rate of redistribution τ is the ideal rate (19) of is the median voter.
Analyzing the case of pi > 1/2, the results of the previous section show that both
minimum information (λ = 1/2) and perfect information (λ = 1) can be ex-ante
optimal. It is easy to construct numerical examples in which both λ = 1/2 and λ = 1
are global maxima of the ex-ante utility function (27). Plugging λ = 1/2 and λ = 1
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in (27) it can be easily computed that u0|λ= 1
2
= (θ¯)2 and that u0|λ=1 =
(θ¯2)2(3θ¯2−2θ2L)
(2θ¯2−θ2L)
2 .
While the set of parameters such that both λ = 1/2 and λ = 1 are global maxima of u0
has zero measure, it follows that there are sets with positive measure such that both
λ = 1/2 and λ = 1 are local maxima. It is not immediate to find inequality relations
on the parameters stating which of the two maxima is the global one, but numerical
exercises show clearly that increasing pi or the difference θH − θL will imply that the
value of u0|λ=1 increases relatively to u0|λ= 1
2
. Therefore the multiplicity of equilibria
can be interpreted as saying that societies with minimal differences in the parameters
pi, θL, θH may find very different levels of information to be optimal.
Example of Multiple Politico-Economic Equilibria. I present a numerical example
with multiple Politico-Economic Equilibria. I consider the following values of the
parameters: pi = 0.761, θL = 1, θH = 1.5, a = 0.5, k = 0. I plug those values in (4),
(5), (7) (19), (16) and consequently those expressions in (27). I obtain a map of the
ex-ante utility (27) in λ, which I plot in figure 1a.
I verify that the function has two global maxima for λ = 1/2 and λ = 1 with
value 1.25352. Therefore given the value of the parameters, both perfect information
and minimum information are ex-ante optimal for the society. Numerical exercises
show that a society with a higher (lower) value of pi or higher (lower) value in the
difference θH−θL than the specified ones would find λ = 1 (λ = 1/2) to be optimal.
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Interpretation of themultiple Politico-Economic Equilibria. I plot τ (19) and Γ (16)
as functions of γ in figures 1b and 1c respectively. As shown by lemma 2 and propo-
sition 2, the uninformative equilibrium is characterized by a lower τ and an higher
Γ than the informative equilibrium. The two variables have opposite effects on ex-
ante utility (27), hence as shown by proposition 6 increasing the level of information
λ has a trade-off effect and multiple equilibria are possible. I further interpret the
two equilibria in terms of effort and output. I plotting the expressions of the level
of effort exerted by the agents who observe σL (20) and σH (21) as functions of λ, in
figures 1d and 1e respectively. I also plot the expression of aggregate effort (22) in
figure 1f. The expression of optimal effort (12) shows that the greater is τ and the
lower is the optimal effort, hence the informative equilibrium is characterized by a
23As already stressed, while the set of parameters such that both λ = 1/2 and λ = 1 are global maxima
of (27) has zero measure, there are sets with positive measure such that both λ = 1/2 and λ = 1 are
local maxima.
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FIGURE 1. Plots of endogenous variables in λ, for pi = 0.761, θL = 1,
θH = 1.5, a = 0.5, k = 0.
severe moral hazard problem as τ is at the maximum level. It is less immediate to no-
tice an opposite effect of adverse selection. Figures 1d and 1e show that the greater
is the precision of the signal and the more separated is the level of effort exerted
by the two groups. When the signal is completely uninformative everyone pools to
the same level of effort, whereas when the signal is perfectly informative the highly
productive choose the maximum level of effort and the low productive choose the
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minimum value of effort. As shown by propositions 3 and 4 the moral hazard ef-
fects dominates the comparative statics of aggregate effort and output hence figures
1f and 1g respectively show that both aggregate effort and output are maximized at
the uninformative equilibrium.
The uninformative equilibrium can be interpreted as a US-type equilibrium. In
this equilibrium both groups of agents hold the same belief and exert the same lev-
els of effort (pooling equilibrium). In this equilibrium, the tax rate is at the minimum
level, whereas aggregate effort and output are at the maximum level. The informa-
tive equilibrium can instead be interpreted as a Europe-type equilibrium. In this
equilibrium the two groups of agents have separated beliefs about the value of the
return on effort. As the low productive agents are the majority, their preferred tax
rate is the prevailing in the economy, hence the level of redistribution is higher than
in the US-type equilibrium. High redistribution and correct beliefs about the re-
turn on effort imply that the low productive ones minimize the effort whereas the
high productive ones maximize it (separating equilibrium). The distortive effect of
taxation results in lower aggregate effort and aggregate output than those at the un-
informative equilibrium. As mentioned in the introduction, my model interprets
different (US vs Europe type) politico and economic outcomes as originated by dif-
ferent optimal informative cultures, where different (US vs Europe type) informative
cultures present the following features: (i) more vs less widespread belief that effort
more than luck determines individual wealth (ii) more vs less widespread belief that
opportunities are equal (iii) more vs less separating educational systems.
7. INTERPRETATION AND GENERALIZATION OF THE RESULTS
The result of the last section should not be interpreted as stating that Europeans are
perfectly informed whereas Americans are not. The first consideration to be made is
that in amore general set-up it does not have to be the case that the more informative
equilibrium is characterized by perfect information: in section C, taking into account
the possibility of heterogeneous endowments, I show that interior values of λ can
be optimal. The second consideration to be made is that the same results in terms
of multiple equilibria would follow with a different underlying true distribution of
the θ′s. For example, take a case in which the true distribution of the θ’s is very
complicated and all that agents can get to know is the average ability and a fraction
pi (1 − pi) of agents has average ability θL (θH). If the structure of the signal is still
the one in (2), then the problem is the same – this can be seen from the fact that
27
the expressions (6) and (16) do not change – hence the same results apply. Or again
the same results would apply in the case of homogeneous returns and aggregate
macroeconomic shocks: θi = θ for all i and again all that agents know is that and
with probability pi (1− pi) the average value of θ is θL (θH ).
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The result should instead be interpreted as showing the possibility and the impli-
cations of different optimal information cultures (more versus less separating). In
order to interpret the result about the existence of multiple equilibria correctly it is
necessary to understand the key-driver of the result. Going back to expression (27),
it is clear that the fact that there may be multiple optimal values of λ – and therefore
multiple equilibria – comes from the non-monotonic effect of λ on (1− τ 2)Γ. In par-
ticular the information structure in (2) implies lemma 2 and therefore that the more
precise is the signal λ and the greater is Γ. This consideration helps to understand
the following general result:
Proposition 7. Given the ex-ante objective function (27), if τ ∈ [0, 1] is part of a politico-
economic equilibrium, then the higher the rate of redistribution τ and the higher the level of
information λ in the equilibrium.
Proof. In a politico-economic equilibrium, λ= arg max (1 − τ 2)Γ. Assume without
loss of generality that two different λ′s are part of a different equilibria with λ′ >
λ′′ > 1/2. Given lemma 2, this implies that Γ(λ′) > Γ(λ′′) and therefore that τ(λ′) >
τ(λ′′). 
The result shows that if multiple equilibria exist then it must be the case that ex-
ante there is a trade-off in increasing the precision of the signal: increasing the pre-
cision of the signal increases Γ, but increasing the precision of the signal can also
increase τ . Hence, when the effect of λ on the object (27) is non-monotonic, then
multiple equilibria are possible. In economic terms the trade-off is between the posi-
tive effect of an increase in the precision of the signal, namely that more information
reduces adverse selection as agents choose effort more optimally given their abilities,
and the negative effect, namely that more information can increase the prevailing tax
rate and this creates amoral hazard effect which reduces aggregate effort. It is impor-
tant to notice that the theorem applies independently from the type of comparative
statics. Proposition 7 shows that in the case of multiple equilibria, a US-(Europe-)
type equilibrium is relatively characterized by: (i) a less (more) informative signal
24The fact that in such cases the true distribution of the θ′s remain unknown shows that amore precise
signal in the Europe-type equilibrium does not imply that Europeans get to know the truth.
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and therefore (ii) less (more) separated beliefs, (iii) lower (higher) redistribution and
therefore (iv) higher (lower) aggregate effort and output.
In other words, the result states that the case of multiple equilibria is a case in
which an economy relatively characterized by more adverse selection and less moral
hazard is ex-ante equally optimal to another one characterized by less adverse selec-
tion andmore moral hazard. The introduction has motivated how this interpretation
is supported by empirical and anecdotal evidence and how the features of the two
equilibria seems to offer new insights about the observed political and economic fea-
tures of different societies. This result is general and robust as it does not depend on
the assumption of homogenous endowments25, or on the underlying distribution of
the abilities26, or again on the linearity of the utility function27.
8. CONCLUSION
This paper presented a simple theoretical model in order to analyze the role of in-
complete information in the determining heterogeneous beliefs and different politico-
economic equilibria. Different comparative statics can be studied with this model
and the results can be used in order to answer natural policy questions as the level
of information which maximizes welfare, output and other politico-economic out-
comes.
The theoretical model presented in the chapter interprets a US-type vs a Europe-
type politico-economic equilibrium as characterized by relative (i) higher adverse
selection – individual beliefs and effort levels are pooling to similar levels despite
underlying heterogeneity in the true distribution of the return on effort – (ii) lower
redistribution (iii) lower moral hazard – redistribution is low and this does not dis-
tort individual effort much (iv) higher aggregate effort and output. Conversely the
Europe-type politico-economic equilibrium is interpreted as an equilibrium charac-
terized by relative (i) lower adverse selection (ii) higher redistribution (iii) higher
25In appendix C I show that heterogenous endowments introduce technical complications because, in
such case, changing the level of information changes the identity of the median voter, different voters
prefer different tax rates given different endowments, hence the comparative statics are generally
discontinuous; nevertheless the ex-ante optimal λ still has to maximize the object (27) and therefore
proposition 7 still applies.
26The objective function (27) would be the same with a different underlying distribution of the abili-
ties.
27As a further test of the model’s robustness, appendix D introduces risk aversion in the model and
shows that the conclusions do not change.
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moral hazard – taxation is high and this diminish individual effort (iv) low aggre-
gate effort and output. The two equilibria are both ex ante optimal. The results
are robust to variations of the basic framework, as the introduction of heterogenous
endowments and a concave utility function.
It is worthy to stress that the presentedmodel does not give clear predictions about
the heterogeneity of exerted effort and the levels of inequality in two different equi-
libria. In the basic version with homogenous endowment k across agents, the non
informative equilibrium (λ = 1/2) is a pooling equilibrium where every agent exerts
the same effort, whereas in the full informative equilibrium (λ = 1) effort levels are
separated and hence output is relatively more heterogenous (pre-tax inequality is
higher). This should not lead to conclude that the model predicts that the Europe-
type equilibrium is characterized by higher inequality and more separated effort
levels than the US-type equilibrium which, as discussed in the introduction, would
contrast some empirical evidence. In the more general exposition of the model with
heterogenous endowments, where interior values of λ can be welfare maximizing, it
can be the case that despite the fact that the more informative equilibrium is char-
acterized by more separated beliefs the fact that redistribution is higher implies that
effort levels are less separated and that output before taxes is less heterogenous. In
such case, the driving force behind the fact that effort levels are less separated in
the Europe-type equilibrium would be the distortive effect of taxation.28 Moreover,
in the model with heterogenous endowments the fact that the rate of redistribution
does not change continuously and monotonically in λ implies that the separation of
effort levels does not have to increase in the level of information.29 In conclusion, the
model focused on the determinants of different beliefs and rates of redistribution but
cannot say much about the levels of inequality as those depend on the values of the
endowments – both directly and through their role in affecting the voted redistribu-
tion – and in the model there is no specification of the wealth generating process,
which should be naturally modeled as dynamic. Therefore, the study of dynamic
inequality and mobility in a framework with endogenous incomplete information
could be an interesting problem for future research.30
28This point seems to have some robust empirical support, see for example Prescott (2004).
29This possibility is shown in the example in appendix C, see figure 2i.
30A first study of such problem can be found in Gabrieli (2009).
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APPENDIX A. PROOF OF LEMMA 2
In order to prove (i) (monotonicity), I compute the expression of the first derivative
of Γ with respect to λ:
dΓ
dλ
=piθL
d
(
λθ(µiσL) + (1− λ)θ(µ
i
H)
dλ
+ econometrica
(1− pi)θH
d
(
(1− λ)θ(µiσL) + λθ(µ
i
H)
)
dλ
=
piθL
(
−
pi(pi − 1)2(θH − θL)(2λ− 1)
(2piλ+ 1− λ− pi)2(2piλ− λ− pi)2
)
+
(1− pi)θH
(
−
pi2(pi − 1)(θH − θL)(2λ− 1)
(2piλ+ 1− λ− pi)2(2piλ− λ− pi)2
)
= econometrica
pi2(1− pi)2(θH − θL)
2(2λ− 1)
(2piλ+ 1− λ− pi)2(2piλ− λ− pi)2
,
which is ≥ 0 for λ ≥ 1/2.
In order to prove (ii) (convexity), I compute the expression of the second derivative
of Γ with respect to λ:
(29)
∂2Γ
(∂λ)2
=
2pi2(1− pi)2(θH − θL)
2(1 + 12piλ(1− λ)(1− pi)− 3pi(1− pi)− 3λ(1− λ))
(piλ+ (1− pi)(1− λ))3 (pi(λ− 1) + λ(pi − 1))3
.
The expression is positive as it can be proved that the term (1 + 12piλ(1 − λ)(1 −
pi)− 3pi(1− pi)− 3λ(1− λ)) (call this X) is strictly positive. To see this, compute the
first derivative with respect to λ which is equal to 3(2pi − 1)2(2λ − 1) and therefore
positive. Hence the term X increases in λ; it is immediate that X is equal to zero for
the smallest value of λ, λ = 1/2. Therefore for any value of pi and λ,X is positive.
APPENDIX B. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
It is useful to plug (19) into (23) and re-express this as
(30) k +
Γ2
a(2Γ− θ(µ)2)
,
where, given that λ ∈ [1/2, 1], θ(µ) = θ(µσL). I compute the first derivative of this
expression with respect to λ:
(31)
2Γ2 ∂Γ
∂λ
− 2θ(µσL)
2Γ∂Γ
∂λ
+ 2θ(µσL)Γ
2 ∂θ(µσL )
∂λ
a2 (2Γ− θ(µσL)
2)2
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where
∂θ(µσL)
∂λ
= − pi(1−pi)(θH−θL)
(piλ+(1−λ)(1−pi))2
≤ 0
∂Γ
∂λ
= pi
2(1−pi)2(2λ−1)(θH−θL)
2
(piλ+(1−pi)(1−λ))2(pi(λ−1)+λ(pi−1))2
≥ 0.
(32)
The denominator of (31) is positive, so the sign of the numerator determines the
sign of the entire expression. I can divide the numerator by 2Γ which is a positive
quantity and the numerator reduces to
(33) (Γ− θ(µσL)
2)
∂Γ
∂λ
+ θ(µσL)Γ
∂θ(µσL)
∂λ
.
The value of this last expression for λ = 1/2 is −4pi(1− pi)(θH − θL)(piθL + (1− pi)θH)
which is negative, hence I conclude that (31) is negative for λ = 1/2. I compute the
second derivative of (33):
(34) (Γ− θ(µσL)
2)d2Γ + (dΓ)2 − θ(µσL)dθ(µσL)dΓ + Γ(dθ(µσL))
2 + θ(µσL)Γd
2θ(µσL),
where
∂2θ(µσL)
(∂λ)2
= 2pi(1−pi)(2pi−1)(θH−θL)
(piλ+(1−pi)(1−λ))3
≥ 0
∂2Γ
(∂λ)2
= 2pi
2(1−pi)2(θH−θL)
2(1+12piλ(1−λ)(1−pi)−3pi(1−pi)−3λ(1−λ))
(piλ+(1−pi)(1−λ))3(pi(λ−1)+λ(pi−1))3
.
(35)
Notice that ∂
2Γ
(∂λ)2
≥ 0 as it has already been proved in Appendix A.
Given the signs of dθ(µσL), d
2θ(µσL), dΓ, d
2Γ and the fact that Γ− θ(µσL) is positive
in the range considered, (33) is strictly positive and therefore (31) can change sign at
most once in the range λ ∈ [1/2, 1]. Therefore in the range λ ∈ [1/2, 1] (31) is either
always negative or negative up to a point and then always positive, this implies the
quasi-convexity.
In order to prove (ii) notice that the quasi-convexity implies that in the range λ ∈
[1/2, 1], the maximum must be either for λ = 1/2 or for λ = 1. The value of the
aggregate output for λ = 1/2 is y¯ = k + θ
2
/a, the value of the aggregate output for
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λ = 0 and λ = 1 is y¯ = k + θ
2
2
a(2θ2−θ2L)
. For the output to be greater at λ = 1/2 than
λ = 1, the condition to be satisfied is the following:
(36) (piθL + (1− pi)θH)
2(2piθ2L + 2(1− pi)θ
2
H − θ
2
L)− (piθ
2
L + (1− pi)θ
2
H)
2 ≥ 0
i.e.
(37) (θL − θH) (−1 + pi)
(
−2 θH
2pi2θL + 2 θH
3pi2 − 2 θHpi
2θL
2+
2 pi2θL
3 − 3 θH
3pi + pi θLθH
2 + 2 θHpi θL
2 + θH
3 + θLθH
2
)
≥ 0
Observe that
(38) − 2 θH
2pi2θL + 2 θH
3pi2 − 2 θHpi
2θL
22 pi2θL
3 − 3 θH
3pi + pi θLθH
2+
2 θHpi θL
2 + θH
3 + θLθH
2 =
(39) 2 pi2θL
3 + 2 pi(1 − pi)θHθL
2 +
(
−2 pi2 + pi + 1
)
θH
2θL +
(
2 pi2 + 1− 3 pi
)
θH
3
Observe that
(40)
(
−2 pi2 + pi + 1
)
θH
2θL +
(
2 pi2 + 1− 3 pi
)
θH
3 =
(1− pi)θ2H(2piθL − 2piθH + θL + θH).
Hence, after a factorization condition (36) can be rewritten as
(41) (θL − θH) (−1 + pi)
(
2 pi2θL
3 + 2 pi(1− pi)θHθL
2+
(1− pi)θ2H(2piθL − 2piθH + θL + θH
)
,
which is positive. Notice that 2piθL−2piθH + θL+ θH ≥ 0 IFF
2θL
2pi−1
≥ θH−θL,which
is always verified in the case pi ≥ 1/2which I am considering.
This proves that condition (36) is satisfied.
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APPENDIX C. ANALYSIS WITH WITH HETEROGENOUS ENDOWMENTS
In this section I explore the possibility of heterogeneous endowments as I assume
that ki takes value kL for a fraction α of the population and value kH for the remain-
ing fraction 1 − α, with kL < kH , and that θ
i takes value θL for a fraction pi of the
population and value θH for the remaining fraction 1 − pi, with θL < θH . The two
distributions are independent. This last assumption and the low of large numbers
which applies to this large economy together imply that (θi, ki) = (θL, kL) for a frac-
tion piα, (θi, ki) = (θH , kL) for a fraction (1 − pi)α, (θ
i, ki) = (θL, kH) for a fraction
pi(1 − α) and (θi, ki) = (θH , kH) for a fraction (1 − pi)(1 − α) of the population. The
new version of (18) – the indirect utility in τ – is given by the following expression:
(42) uit = τ(k
i − k¯) + (1− τ)2θ(µi)2/a+ τ(1− τ)Γ/a− (1− τ)2θ(µi)2/2a.
Assumption 1 still assures that expression (42) is strictly concave as the variable k
does not enter the second order conditions. The new expression for the ideal tax rate
of agent i follows:
(43) τ(ki, µi) = 1−
1 + a(k
i
−k¯)
Γ
2− θ(µ
i)2
Γ
.
As explained by Benabou and Tirole (2006), the numerator of (43) indicates that a
lower relative endowment (ki − k¯) naturally increases the desired tax rate and that
wether progressive or regressive, such distributive goals must be traded off against
distortions to the effort-elastic component of the tax base (moral hazard problem).
As before, the denominator indicates that increases in the prospects of upper mo-
bility decrease the ideal tax rate. The tuple (ki, µi) identifies the preferred tax rate
by voter i and given α, pi and λ, there are four groups of voters in the economy. If
α ∈ (1/2, 1]
(
α ∈ [0, 1/2)
)
the majority of the agents has an endowment ki = kL(
ki = kH
)
. If pσL > 1/2
(
pσL < 1/2
)
, the majority of the agents holds a belief µσL(
µσH
)
at t = 1. I analyze the voting outcome analyzing the various possible cases.
Voting outcome with heterogenous endowments. Before proceeding with the var-
ious cases notice that the fact that λ ≥ 1/2 implies that µσH ≥ µσL and therefore the
following ranking of preferred tax rates: τ(kH , µσH ) ≤ min{τ(kH , µσL), τ(kL, µσH )} ≤
max{τ(kH , µσL), τ(kL, µσH)} ≤ τ(kL, µσL).
31
31This because τ(ki, µi)monotonically decreases in both ki and µi.
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Case 1: α ≥ 1/2 and pi ≥ 1/2. α ≥ 1/2 implies that the majority of the agents has
ki = kL. λ ≥ 1/2 and pi ≥ 1/2 together imply that pσL ≥ 1/2. There are two possible
sub-cases.
Case 1.1: αpσL > 1/2. The pivotal group is the one who prefers τ(kL, µσL); this
because more than half of the population belongs to this group.
Case 1.2: αpσL < 1/2. If τ(kL, µσH ) > τ(kH , µσL) then the pivotal group is the one
who prefers τ(kL, µσH), this because the ranking implies that the group with τ(kL, ·)
includes the median voter but this does not belong to the group with τ(kL, µσL). If
τ(kH , µσL) > τ(kL, µσH) then the pivotal group is the one who prefers τ(kH , µσL), this
because the ranking implies that the group with τ(·, µσL) includes the median voter
but this does not belong to the group with τ(kL, µσL).
Case 2: α ≥ 1/2 and pi ≤ 1/2. pi ≤ 1/2 and λ ≥ 1/2 imply that pσL ≤ 1/2, therefore
αpσL > 1/2 is never verified and hence Case 1.1 is never verified. Therefore Case 2
has the same outcome of Case 1.2.
Case 3: α ≤ 1/2 and pi ≥ 1/2. α ≤ 1/2 implies that the majority of the agents has
ki = kH . λ ≥ 1/2 and pi ≥ 1/2 together imply that pσL ≥ 1/2. There are two possible
sub-cases.
Case 3.1: (1− α)pσL > 1/2. The pivotal group is the one who prefers τ(kH , µσL); this
because more than half of the population belongs to this group.
Case 3.2: (1 − α)pσL < 1/2. If τ(kL, µσH) > τ(kH , µσL) then the pivotal group is the
one who prefers τ(kH , µσL)whereas if τ(kH , µσL) > τ(kL, µσH) then the pivotal group
is the one who prefers τ(kL, µσH ).
Case 4: α ≤ 1/2 and pi ≤ 1/2. pi ≤ 1/2 and λ ≥ 1/2 together imply that pσL ≤ 1/2,
therefore (1 − α)pσL > 1/2 is never verified and hence Case 3.1 is never verified.
Therefore Case 4 has the same outcome as case 3.2.
It is important to notice how heterogenous endowments can imply discontinuous
comparative statics. In order to see this assume to be in case 1.1 where the pivotal tax
rate is τ(kL, µσL). If λ increases the pivotal tax rate remains τ(kL, µσL) and increases
monotonically till τ(kL, θL) for λ = 1. If λ decreases it is certain that there will be a
λ∗ ∈ (1/2, 1) small enough such that the condition αpσL > 1/2 is not satisfied. This
because for λ = 1/2 the condition is not satisfied and therefore for the continuity of
αpσL in λ there will be a value λ
∗ arbitrarily close to λ = 1/2 (the greater is α and
the smaller is λ∗) such that the condition does not hold. For this λ∗, either τ(kL, µσH)
or τ(kH , µσL) becomes pivotal and hence the pivotal tax rate jumps downwards in a
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discontinuous way. Discontinuous comparative statics imply the possibility of inte-
rior welfare maximizing values of λ even if the comparative statics are monotonic.
The following numerical example shows this possibility.
Example of multiple equilibria with discontinuous comparative statics. In the
case of heterogenous endowments the ex-ante objective function is still given by
(27), where k = k¯ = αkL + (1−)kH . Consider the following values: α = 0.8, pi = 0.7,
θL = 1, θH = 1.5, a = 8, kL = 1, kH = 1.812. Such values imply that pσL = 0.4λ + 0.3.
If there is a value λ∗ such that α(0.4λ∗+0.3) > 1/2, then λ∗ is a point of discontinuity.
For such a λ∗ to exist it must be that 0.7α > 1/2, i.e. α > 5/7. I take the case of
α = 0.8, which implies λ∗ ≃ 0.81.
I analyze the object ui0 as a function of λ. For λ > λ
∗ the voted tax rate is τ =
τ(kL, µσL). I plot this function of λ in figure 2a. For λ < λ
∗ the voted tax rate is
the greater between τ(kL, µσH ) and τ(kH , µσL). I plot both functions of λ in figure
2b. The figure shows that τ(kL, µσH ) is greater throughout the interval, therefore for
λ < λ∗ the voted tax rate is τ(kL, µσH). I plot the voted tax rate in figure 2c. It can
be computed that ui0 is maximized and equal to 1.63128 for both λ = 0.81 and λ = 1,
hence the multiple equilibria. I plot ui0, τ , Γ and the optimal values of individual and
aggregate effort respectively in figures 2d, 2e, 2f, 2g, 2h. I also plot figures 2f and 2g
together in figure 2i, where the thicker line represents figure 2f.
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FIGURE 2. Endogenous variables with heterogenous endowments, for
pi = 0.7, θL = 1, θH = 1.5, a = 8, kL = 1, kH = 1.812.
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APPENDIX D. ANALYSIS WITH CONCAVE UTILITY
As already explained in section 5, in the model that I have presented the trade-off
effect of information – and hence the possibility of multiple ex-ante optimal levels
of information – arise because on one hand information increases ex-ante inefficient
taxes (hence increases the moral hazard problem) and on the other hand information
improves the efficiency of effort’s allocations (hence reduces the adverse selection
problem). One natural question to ask is wether this trade-off – and hence the result
of multiple equilibria – is robust to the introduction of risk aversion in the problem.
With a concave ex-ante utility function in consumption, ceteris paribus, redistribu-
tion is ex-ante efficient. On the other hand redistribution still decreases individual
effort and therefore decreases the amount of output which is redistributed, hence
the overall effect of taxation on ex-ante utility is not clear a priori. Moreover, with
a concave ex-ante utility function in consumption not even the overall effect of in-
formation is a-priori clear. This is the case even when it is ignored the effect that
information has on the prevailing tax rate, in other words when the level of redistri-
bution is fixed. The reason for this is that on one hand information separates the lev-
els of exerted effort implemented (which is ex-ante un-optimal given the concavity
of the utility function) but on the other hand information improves effort’s alloca-
tions and therefore it increases the amount of output which is redistributed. Hence
in the case in which information increases the prevailing tax rate, a concave utility
function implies that increasing the level of information has two positive effects: to
increase ex -ante optimal taxes and to increase aggregate effort and output (which
will be redistributed). Increasing the level of information has also two negative ef-
fects: to separate the levels of effort and output (which is ex ante un-optimal given
concavity) and to decrease individual effort through higher taxation and therefore to
decrease the output which will be redistributed.
In order to gain insights about the overall effect of information and to check the
robustness of the result that ex-ante utility is nor monotonic nor concave in the level
of information I present some numerical examples. I introduce a utility function
which is concave in consumption at time 0, whenwelfare is evaluated, but I maintain
the same linear utility function for the rest of the problem, namely when both taxes
are voted for and when effort is chosen. The reason for doing this is to maintain
the tractability. As it is shown in the analysis of Meltzer and Richard (1981) and
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followers, using a concave function for the choice of effort and voting implies that
the prevailing tax rate is not an explicit function. 32
Numerical exampleswith concave utility. Without loss of generality I fix that ki = 0
for all i and that a = 1 in order to simplify the computations. Agent i utility function
at time 0 is concave in consumption and it is given by the following expression:
(44) ui0 = E
i
0[
1
γ
(ci)γ − (ei)2/2],
with γ < 1. The period 1 problem is still the one described in section 2, hence the
expression for optimal individual effort is still (12) and the expression for the aggre-
gate product of effort is still given by (25). I plug those expressions together with (9)
and (1) into (44) and I obtain the expression for expected utility conditional on the
observation of σL:
(45)
u0σL = µL
1
γ
((1−τ)θLeσL+τ(1−τ)Γ)
γ+(1−µL)
1
γ
((1−τ)θHeσL+τ(1−τ)Γ)
γ−(eσL)
2/2,
and a symmetric expression given the observation of σH , where eσi is given by ex-
pression (12) and it represents optimal individual effort conditional on the observa-
tion of σi. Using those expressions, I can rewrite expression (44) as
(46) ui0 = pσLuσL + (1− pσL)uσH =
piλ
1
γ
((1− τ)θLeσL + τ(1− τ)Γ)
γ+
(1− pi)(1− λ)
1
γ
((1− τ)θHeσL + τ(1− τ)Γ)
γ+
pi(1− λ)
1
γ
((1− τ)θLeσH + τ(1− τ)Γ)
γ+
(1− pi)λ
1
γ
((1− τ)θHeσH + τ(1− τ)Γ)
γ − (1− τ)2Γ/2.
It is clear from expression (46) that on one hand τ has the positive effect of re-
distributing and on the other hand τ has the negative effect to decrease the amount
of resources which are redistributed. It is also clear that also increasing the level of
information λ has two opposite effects on welfare. One one hand there is a positive
32The type of utility function which I introduce can be shown to belong to the class of RINCE Pref-
erences introduced by Farmer (1990). This class of preferences imply that the utility is concave over
non-stochastic outcomes (like the period 0 utility function), but it becomes risk neutral over stochastic
outcomes (like the period 1 utility function).
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FIGURE 3. Endogenous variables with concave utility, for pi = 0.8, θL =
1, θH = 1.5 and different values of γ.
effect because Γ increases in λ (lemma 2) and on the other hand increasing λ sep-
arates the levels of effort implemented (lemma 1) which is non optimal given the
concavity. In order to check for the overall effect of the level of information on ex-
ante utility I proceed with some numerical examples. I consider the case in which
pσL ≥ 1/2 and the majority of agents observe σL so that the prevailing tax rate is τσL .
It follows from proposition 2 that in this case the voted tax rate τ increases in the
level of information.
I consider a numerical example with a coefficient of risk aversion of γ = −1. I plot
expression (46) as a function of λ in figure 3a. The figure shows that there is an inte-
rior solution in terms of λ. This example proves the possibility of non monotonicity
of information.
Decreasing the coefficient of risk aversion implies that the beneficial effect of in-
formation through the tax rate is less valued. I Consider the case of γ = 0.8. I plot
expression (46) as a function of λ in figure 3b. The figure shows that the optimal
value of information is still unique but smaller than before. This example shows
that also with a concave utility in consumption, ex-ante utility does not have to be
concave in information.
It is also possible to have a case with multiple optimal values of information. I
consider the case of γ = 0.845, I plot expression (46) as a function of λ in figure
3c. As before, the equilibrium with relatively higher (lower) information has higher
(lower) taxes and more (less) separated effort choices, while the solution with lower
(higher) information has lower (higher) taxes but less separated effort choices.
